# Secure Mobile Database Applications: A Case Study

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**Abstract.** In this work, we present a case study of a secure mobile database application. In particular, we design, implement and evaluate a mobile database application for an electronic announcement board. We identify a set of security issues and apply appropriate techniques to satisfy the corresponding security requirements.

Keywords: Security, Mobile Databases, Replication, Mobile Devices

### 1 Introduction

Mobile devices are gradually becoming commonplace. The computational and networking power of mobile devices is constantly increasing and new technologies are integrated into them to support new functionalities and services. On the other hand, the field of databases and more generally data management is also expanded with new services and applications. Several modern database management systems support small-footprint databases that can be executed on mobile devices and admit disconnected computing and synchronization with a central database. We call an application that comprises a server with a central database and a number of autonomous mobile clients with replicated parts of the database a mobile database application.

One of the most important issues of modern computing systems is the provision of sufficient security and privacy guarantees for the user data. Security issues of mobile devices are discussed in recent works like [7]. In the field of databases and database management systems, security is a well studied subject. See for example [8] and the related chapters in [6, 3, 10]. More recently, issues about privacy in databases are discussed for example in [1]. However in the case of a mobile database application there are additional security challenges due to the distributed nature of the application and the hardware constraints of mobile devices. Achieving a sufficient level of security for such a platform is an important problem which has to be addressed. For example, data privacy and confidentiality is identified in [2] as one of the critical open issues and research directions in mobile databases.

In this work, we consider mobile database applications and focus on the security issues that arise in this context. For this aim we present a case study

of a secure mobile database application. In particular, we design, develop and test an electronic announcement board. A database server is used for the central storage of all application data, while small-footprint relational databases are used on the mobile clients. We identify a set of security issues and show how to handle these issues on the prototype mobile application.

The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. The mobile database application is described in Section 2. Security techniques are presented in Section 3. The implementation and the test platform are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents possible attacks and how they are faced by the application and Section 6 contains a final discussion.

# 2 The Mobile Database Application

We consider the following mobile database application (MDA): An electronic announcement board where authorized users can publish and/or read announcements. There are two types of users of the announcement board, author users and read-only users. The rights of a user are determined by its type: An author user has the right to create new announcements and to modify or delete announcements authored by himself. A read-only user has the right to read all announcements. The announcements are centrally stored in a database server and the users, author users and read-only users, can use mobile devices to perform their application related operations remotely. The core of the application is build on mobile database technology. As shown in Figure 1, the application uses the client-server model. From the user's point of view there are two main application components: An authoring tool for authoring announcements and a viewer to access all announcements. Moreover, if the announcements are intended for public access, then read-only access can also be provided through a web interface.




Fig. 1. The mobile database application

### 2.1 Concepts and the mobile platform

In this work, we define a mobile database as a small-footprint database that is installed on a mobile device. Most commonly the local database is a replica of a part of a central database that is installed at a server computer.

Major database management system (DBMS) vendors like Oracle, IBM and Microsoft, are providing mobile extensions for their database servers. We have chosen a Pocket PC with Windows Mobile 5.0 and SQL Server 2005 Mobile Edition as the computing platform for our mobile application. However, corresponding technologies of other vendors could also be used. See for example Table 1.

Table 1. Indicative combinations of mobile platforms and mobile DBMS's

Mobile Device	Operating System	Mobile DBMS
Pocket PC	Symbian	Oracle Mobile
PocketPC	Windows	MS SQL Server Mobile Edition
	Symbian, Windows Mobile	
Palm, Pocket PC	Symbian, Windows Mobile	Sybase SQL Anywhere

### 2.2 Motivation

In a mobile database application a part or a replica of the database is locally installed on the mobile device. This is a significant difference compared to a conventional client-server application where all data is centrally stored in a database server. The approach with a mobile database provides the necessary autonomy to the mobile device to work independently from the central database. The client application can work with the mobile database asynchronously, and needs to connect to the central database only when it is necessary to synchronize. This approach has several advantages compared to a conventional approach where the clients do not use local storage:

- Flexibility and Reliability: Asynchronous operation makes the application more flexible and tolerant to network failures.
- Efficiency: Except the synchronization steps, for all other operations the client has immediate access to the data since it is locally stored on the mobile device.
- Enhanced security: Disconnected computing reduces the total time that the mobile device is exposed to potential attacks over the network.
- Energy efficiency: The mobile device has to operate its network system, hardware and software, only during the synchronization operations.
- Reduced fees for network usage: This holds in the case where the usage of the communication link is charged. If the network link up-time is charged

then the benefits are obvious. However, even if only the network traffic is charged, the decentralized approach of a mobile database can still reduce network fees. In this case the cost decrease is achieved by reducing the traffic volume between the mobile device and the server.

### 2.3 Architecture

The architecture of the mobile database application (MDA) is shown in Figure 2. The application uses the client-server model<sup>1</sup>. The server-side of the application has three main components: A central database, a server agent and a web server. The central database provides the central storage place for all announcements. The server agent connects the central database with the web server. The web server provides the end-point of the communication link that is used to transfer data between the mobile and the central database.




Fig. 2. The architecture of the application

The client-side has also three main components: The client application, the client agent and the mobile database. The client agent is responsible for the communication between the mobile database and the central database and between the client application and the mobile database. The client application is a mobile application with a graphical user interface (GUI) that provides the necessary interface to the users for using the application. The mobile database is a local small-footprint database on the mobile device which replicates an appropriate part of the central database.

The mobile database application has to use a communication link between the client and the server. The only requirement for the communication link is that it must support the secure hypertext transfer protocol (https). There are currently several different options for providing the communication link. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Note that due to the existence of an agent at both endpoints of the communication link, one could also argue that the actual application has three tiers. We prefer to classify it as a conventional two-tier client-server application because in the mobile database application the agents (middle tier) are transparent to the user and almost transparent even to the application developer.

most important are Wireless Network, Bluetooth, GPRS and 3G. At both endpoints of the communication link are agents of the mobile database management system. We tested our application with a wireless network connection and with a Bluetooth connection.

### 3 Security Issues and Techniques

In this Section, we describe the security-related techniques that are applied in the mobile database application.

#### 3.1 Secure network connection

The mobile database and the central database have to be synchronized at specific times. The synchronization is implemented in the system software of the mobile database and is performed over the http protocol. Using http has the significant advantage of using a widely available protocol and possibly the disadvantage that its performance may be lower than a proprietary protocol for the database synchronization operation. We have selected the secure http protocol (https) to perform the necessary synchronization operations between the mobile and the central database. More precisely we use https with server and client authentication. This choice assures:

- Confidentiality of the data that is transferred.
- Authentication of the server computer.
- Authentication of the client computer. Even though client authentication worked on the mobile platform we did not manage to apply it within the synchronization process of the mobile database. We believe that this is due to a shortage of the current system software and that will be overcome in the forthcoming versions.

### 3.2 Encrypted local database

The local database on the mobile device is encrypted and each time the user opens the mobile database, he has to enter his password. In case the mobile device is stolen or violated by an intruder, the data that is stored on the local database is not readable. The encryption algorithm is part of SQL Server Mobile Edition and unfortunately we were not able to find documentation for the specific algorithm. We assume that the vendor does not simply rely on obscurity and that the encryption is based on one of the established symmetric key encryption algorithms. If the build-in encryption algorithm of the mobile database is considered insufficient, it is of course possible to implement this feature within the client application.

### 3.3 User authentication at the database server

The synchronization of the small-footprint database that is installed on the mobile device with the central database is performed with database replication technology. For this purpose, there is an appropriate publication at the database server. A publication is the meta-data package of information about which data is replicated. The mobile database uses the publication of the database server for the synchronization operation. In order to connect to the publication an appropriate user account on the database server has to be used. This means that the application user has to be authenticated at the database server.

### 3.4 Authentication at the web server

As already noted, the communication between the mobile database and the central database is performed over https. At the server side the communication link is handled by a web server. Hence, it is possible to take advantage of standard web server authentication and require the user to authenticate at the web interface level. This requirement is very important since it provides protection for the mobile database agent that is executed at the server side within the web server. Without web server authentication every network user would be able to contact the server-side agent by simply using the appropriate URL.

### 3.5 Server-side mobile agent account

Both endpoints of the communication link are handled by mobile database agents. During a synchronization process, the agent operations on the server-side can either be executed by the default agent account of the server's operating system or in the context of a dedicated account of the server's operating system. We use a dedicated operating system account for the execution of the agent service. The account has been granted the minimum permissions that are necessary for its role. This decision satisfies the common security rule of granting minimum sufficient permissions.

# 3.6 Separate user accounts for the authoring and the read-only application

In case a user has to use the application both as an author of announcements and as a reader of all announcements we can either assign two accounts to the user, an authoring account and a read-only account, or grant both functionalities to a unique user account. Even though the security of the application would not be lowered by using a unique account, we preferred to use two separate, dedicated accounts. This approach reflects in a more natural way the structure of the application.

### 3.7 Application provided security

For authoring operations, each user has access only to his own data. A set of database triggers implemented in the database server, check that the data manipulation operations of the user are valid. This check prevents all users from accidental or malicious modifications of data for which they have no authorization. More precisely, an author

- can create new announcements that are signed with his name,
- can delete or update announcements that are signed with his name, and
- has no access to announcements created/signed by other users.

The above functionality resembles in a loose sense the virtual private database technology (VPD) of Oracle [9].

### 3.8 The read-only client

The read-only part of the MDA is implemented as a separate client application. The read-only client provides access for viewing all announcements. We apply certain techniques to assure the security of the central database:

- The publisher of the database server that is used for the synchronization of the read-only application is defined to be read-only. Consequently it is not possible to apply any modification to the central database from the read-only application.
- Read-only clients have no access to the main table of the central database. Instead the read-only clients read the announcements from a replicated instance of the main table. A set of database triggers implemented in the database server keeps the replicated table always updated. In case an accidental or malicious modification of the data in the replicated table would occur, it would have no effect on the main table of the application.

### 3.9 Communication between the servers

The announcements are also available over http as a web page. A dynamic web page with aspx code gives a list of the announcements. The web server must have access to the database in order to read the data. For this reason we have to deal with a common security issue in database-driven web sites: Choosing the appropriate database account that the web server is using to access the database. We created a specific account in the database that has only one permission: To perform a select on the replicated announcements table. This decision too, applies the principle of granting the minimum sufficient permissions.

### 3.10 Client-side data encryption

We also tested a common but very important feature, that of encrypting the user data in the database. Even though this feature is not directly relevant to

the announcements application, we consider it very important for secure mobile database applications and more generally for secure database applications. The user gives a password to the client application and all his critical data is encrypted at the client-side before it is permanently stored in the database. This encryption guarantees the confidentiality of the data against any database user including the local database administrators. The approach is very simple: The client application applies a symmetric key encryption algorithm, for example AES, and stores the encrypted data into the database. When the user reads the data, he provides his password and the data is decrypted. We verified this approach and it works transparently as soon as the user has given his password. A shortage of the current mobile platform was that some library functions, like for example the function "PasswordDeriveBytes", were not provided by .NET Compact Framework v2.0. We overcame this problem by providing a hand-coded implementation of the required function that was absent.

## 4 Implementation

### 4.1 Development

The development platform for the MDA was Visual Studio 2005 with cross compilation for Windows Mobile 5.0 and the .NET Compact Framework v2.0. The application is implemented in C# and the development follows the approach described in [4].

### 4.2 Testing

The mobile database application (MDA) has first been tested on a Windows Mobile Emulator and then on a real Pocket PC with Windows Mobile 5.0.

- 1. MDA on a Windows Mobile emulator. To execute MDA on an emulator, we used Visual Studio to start the emulator and to install the application on the emulator. The emulator works as a real Windows Mobile Pocket PC. The network connection for the emulator is provided by ActiveSync. We tested all operations of the mobile application and they worked well.
- 2. MDA on a Pocket PC with Windows Mobile 5.0 (Figure 3). In this case we use Visual Studio and ActiveSync to install the MDA on the mobile device. The mobile application can use any of the available communication options for the synchronization. For example Wireless Network, Bluetooth, GPRS, 3G. The only requirement is that the communication link must support the https protocol. We tested the application with a Wireless Network connection and a Bluetooth connection. All operations and security features of the mobile application worked well.

A detailed description of the MDA can be found in [5]. The application code can found at URL: "http://utopia.duth.gr/~pefraimi/projects/SecMobDB".




Fig. 3. The mobile application on a Pocket PC with Windows Mobile 5.0

### 5 Resistance in Attacks

The overall security of the MDA is achieved by ensuring:

- Security for the mobile device
- Security for the central computer
- Security for the communication link
- Security for application specific issues

We examine the tolerance of the mobile database application against a comprehensive set of threats/attacks. We can distinguish the following types of threats:

- Threats from any user with access to the communication link
- Threats from a read-only user of the application
- Threats from an author user of the application

We consider a set of specific threats/attacks for the MDA and discuss how each threat is faced by our approach:

- Attack on the communication link: Eavesdropping of network traffic of the application or a fake client or server node. The security of the communication link is assured with the usage of the https protocol.
  - Eavesdropping for example with a sniffer: In https all traffic is encrypted and hence, the confidentiality of the packet contents is protected.
  - Fake client or server node: Using both the client and the server authentication features of https (features that are provided by the Secure Sockets Layer SSL) assures the legitimacy of both the client and the server nodes. As already noted, in the current version of the mobile database software, the client authentication of https did not work properly within the synchronization process.

- Attack against the mobile device: The encryption of the mobile database ensures the confidentiality of the local data in case the mobile device is stolen or attacked.
  - Stolen device: The local database that is installed on the mobile device is encrypted and hence, if the device is stolen, the application data is not readable. We note again, that the encryption is a feature of SQL Server Mobile and that we were not able to find any documentation about the encryption algorithm that is used.
  - Network attack: The mobile database admits the client application to work while the mobile device is disconnected. The mobile device has to enable its network connection only during the synchronization operation of the mobile database. However, even during the short period that the portable device uses its network connection it can become the target of malicious software. In Windows Mobile there is currently no build-in firewall but there are third-party products that can cover this shortage. In any case the data that is stored in the mobile database is encrypted and cannot be read.
- Attack against the server: The server computer where the server part of the application is executed must permit network access, in particular incoming connection requests, to its web server. Hence the server computer can become the target of attacks against the web server. We apply common security techniques to protect the server. Discussing these techniques is beyond the scope of this paper. There are numerous sources for security of computing systems offering web services.
- Attack against the MDA: An important threat for any multi-user application comes from the registered users of the application.
  - Attack from a read-only user: A read-only user can read all announcements. If a read-only user attempts to modify the contents of the database he will not succeed. First, the GUI of the client application does not provide this feature. This prevents unintentional attempts to modify data. Now, if a user intentionally uses some proprietary software or a low-level database utility to modify the application data, he will still fail because the publication at the database server is read-only. Finally, even if any data would be modified (in some way that we did not predict), the change would concern not the real database table, but a replicated table, that is used for the read-only services.
  - Attack from an author user: An author user has more permissions than a read-only user. We consider what will happen if an author user attempts to perform operations for which his is not authorized. In this case too, the GUI prevents unintentional users attempts to perform illegal operations. For the case that user intentionally attempts to modify data of other users by using some proprietary software or a low-level database utility, a set of triggers in the database server (see Section 3.7) prohibits the unauthorized operations.

### 6 Discussion

Developing a secure mobile database application is an important task. Our experience with developing and testing the application is satisfactory in several aspects. The efforts to implement the mobile database application were reasonable, it works reliably and it is efficient and user-friendly. For the security of a mobile database application, our case study showed that there are sufficient tools and techniques available to provide a security level comparable to the security level of conventional platforms. The few shortages that we faced are most likely technical issues that should be overcome in the forthcoming versions of the system software of the mobile platforms. Finally, an important issue is the lack of appropriate documentation for certain encryption algorithms that are used within the system software of mobile platforms.

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